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PART I – INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The advances and challenges experienced by Korea’s health system in the last forty 
years can provide many important lessons for low and middle- income countries. From 
the late seventies to the first years of the new century, Korea implemented measures 
that led to a rapid expansion of population coverage and to the achievement of universal 
health coverage (UHC) in only twelve years. The country instituted major health reforms 
aimed at ensuring efficient and equitable delivery of services and improving financing 
structures of its health system. UHC is a continuous process that requires building a 
sustainable financial protection system; the Korean government implemented a series of 
reforms even after health insurance covered the entire population. 
 
While these objectives were largely achieved, and as it was to be expected, the reform 
faced important political opposition from key stakeholders. Some of the measures 
introduced to deal with these challenges had negative fiscal “side effects” causing the 
government to introduce a comprehensive set of policies and actions with the goal of 
preserving the fiscal and financial sustainability of the system. 
 
The next section reviews the historical development of the Korean health insurance 
system and the 1977-1989 road to UHC. It also examines the process and outcomes of 
two major health care reforms in 2000: the merger of health insurance societies into a 
single insurer, and the separation of the processes of prescribing and dispensing 
medicines. Then the development of governance and health information systems to 
improve transparency and accountability is examined. It discusses lessons and policy 
implications relevant for developing countries. The report concludes by examining future 
challenges for the Korean health insurance system. 
 10 
 
PART II– DEVELOPMENT OF KOREA’S HEALTH INSURANCE 
AND ROAD TO UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE (UHC) 
 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT  
 
Korea’s health insurance scheme was formally established in December of 1963 with 
the enactment of the Health Insurance Law by the military government immediately after 
its coup d’état. The law, however, did not require compulsory enrolment due to the weak 
economic and social development of the country at the time. Mandatory social health 
insurance was not implemented until the mid-1970s, with the significant revision of the 
Law in December of 1976 that included mandatory enrolment in the health insurance 
scheme.  
 
The need for political legitimization of an authoritarian (military) political regime played 
an important role in the introduction and extension of social health insurance in Korea 
(Kwon, H., 1999). Contrary to western welfare states, labor movements, leftist parties or 
class struggles played no role in the development of health insurance in Korea. There 
was no labor party or social democratic political party, and labor unions became active 
only in the late 1980s. With an authoritarian top-down policy process driven by elite 
bureaucrats and political leaders, the government led the introduction of health 
insurance in Korea (Kwon, 2009). Government expected that health insurance for 
employees would help stabilize the labor market by keeping skilled workers in the 
workforce, which was an important policy concern in an era of rapid economic 
expansion.  
 
The rapid pace of economic growth and improvement of well-being was generated by 
the export-driven industrial policy through a series of five-year Economic Development 
Plans that started in the early 1960s. Then the government recognized the country’s 
need for a welfare system, leading to the emphasis placed on social development 
policies by the Fourth Economic Development Plan of 1977-1981, which aimed at 
distributing the fruits of economic development to the people. In fact, a combination of 
political and economic factors contributed to the rapid extension of health insurance 
coverage to unprotected population groups, particularly to the self-employed and 
workers in the informal sector, who constitute a major challenge for achieving universal 
coverage (Kwon, 2009). 
 
On the political side, the 1987 presidential election, the first free national-scale 
presidential election in about 20 years, prompted President Chun Doo Whan and the 
presidential candidate of the ruling party, Roh Tae Woo, both former military generals, 
to seek political support and legitimacy by proposing UHC. The ruling party used the 
expansion of social welfare programs as a major item on its campaign agenda and in 
1986 the Government announced a UHC plan to include the self-employed in the 
National Health Insurance (NHI).1 On the economic side, the booming economy of the 
late-1980s, with Korea experiencing record-high annual growth rates of about 
12 percent between 1986 and 1988, substantially improved the capacity of the self-
employed to pay for social insurance contributions. It also provided the government with 
                                                 
1 The national pension scheme and the minimum wage system were also introduced at this time. 
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the fiscal capacity to subsidize health insurance for the self-employed, the last group to 
join the NHI in 1989. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF KOREA’S NATIONAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE 
 
The implementation of Korea’s National Health Insurance scheme began with those 
population groups that were easiest to reach and enroll. Accordingly, employees of large 
corporations with more than 500 workers were the first group to be covered by health 
insurance in 1977. Health insurance then was extended to workers in firms with more 
than 300 employees in 1979. It was further extended to firms with more than 100 
employees in 1981 and to those with more than 16 employees in 1983. A Medical Aid 
program (Medicaid) for the poor was also introduced in 1977, and public-sector 
employees and school teachers joined the health insurance in 1979. To extend health 
insurance to the self-employed, the government implemented pilot programs in three 
rural areas in 1981 and in one urban area and two additional rural areas in 1982. Those 
pilots were targeted for the self-employed and included premium setting and collection, 
benefit package, and social marketing for enrolees and providers in the community 
level. The health insurance program achieved universal coverage of the population by 
including the rural self-employed in January 1988 and the urban self-employed in 1989 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Expansion of Population Coverage in Korea (Unit: 1,000 persons) 
 
1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2011 
Health 
Insurance + 
Medical Aid 
5296 
(100%) 
11368 
(100%) 
21254 
(100%) 
44110 
(100%) 
45429 
(100%) 
47466 
(100%) 
49154 
(100%) 
50909 
(100%) 
Health 
Insurance 
3200 
(60%) 
9226 
(81%) 
17995 
(85%) 
40180 
(91%) 
44016 
(97%) 
45896 
(97%) 
47392 
(96%) 
49299 
(97%) 
Employee  
Health Ins. 
3140 
(59%) 
9161 
(80.4%) 
16425 
(77.5%) 
20759 
(47%) 
21559 
(47%) 
22404 
(47%) 
27233 
(55%) 
33257 
(65%) 
Self 
Employed 
Health Ins. 
- - 
375 
(2%) 
19457 
(44%) 
22457 
(49%) 
23492 
(49%) 
20159 
(41%) 
16043 
(32%) 
Occupational 
/Voluntary  
Medical Ins.  
- /60 
(1%) 
- /65 
(0.6%) 
954(4.5%)/ 
241(1%) 
- - - - - 
Medical Aid  
2095 
(40%) 
2142 
(19%) 
3259 
(15%) 
3930 
(9%) 
1413 
(3%) 
1570 
(3%) 
1762 
(4%) 
1609 
(3%) 
   Source: Statistics Korea, various years. 
 
Contrary to the rather smooth extension of health insurance to formal sector employees, 
its extension to the self-employed faced tough resistance (Kwon, 2009). Farmers 
requested government subsidies for their contribution and the expansion of health care 
facilities in rural areas to improve their access to medical care. Consequently, 
government subsidized health insurance for the self-employed and provided financial 
incentives and loans for private hospitals to open in rural areas. The subsidy was initially 
about half of the total revenue of the health insurance scheme for the self-employed, 
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and was later reduced incrementally. As government tightly regulated the fee schedule 
for (both public and private) providers through health insurance, lower fees (than 
customary fees) were applied to enrollees of health insurance, which provided an 
incentive to join health insurance. 
 
From the beginning, the health insurance system adopted family-based membership, 
and dependents became members of the scheme in which their household head was 
enrolled. A well-established family registry system made family-based coverage easier 
to implement. The NHI also used a pluralistic system with multiple insurance societies 
(funds), which were based on either firms (for the formal sector) or regions (for the self-
employed). For the employee health insurance scheme, large corporations had 
individual firm-level insurance societies, while small and medium-sized firms and the 
self-employed were pooled to join an insurance society in their geographic area. In the 
society (fund)-based health insurance, risk pooling was limited as it was only up to the 
level of each insurance society. Each insurance fund was responsible for revenue 
collection, enrollment, and limited amount of ancillary benefits, and government set 
uniform statutory benefits and fee schedule for providers. 
 
The government’s decision to structure the health insurance financing through 
decentralized multiple funds rather than a centralized single fund, was to encourage the 
sustainability among the insured and to minimize government financial involvement. The 
rationale to cover employees and the self-employed in separate insurance societies was 
to avoid the problems associated with different levels of income assessment and 
contribution collection between the two groups. It was much easier to assess income 
(ability to pay) and collect contribution from employees than the self-employed. 
 
Health care provision under the NHI was dominated by private providers, who were 
reimbursed by fee-for-service payment. The fee schedule was determined by the 
government rather than negotiated, and providers complained that the fee level was too 
low. Fee for service payment for all types of care, from primary care to tertiary inpatient 
care, have had the potential for inefficiency and demand inducement. All these 
characteristics of the Korean health system would greatly impact its development as will 
be seen in Section III. 
 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
 
Korea has achieved big improvements in health outcomes such as life expectancy and 
mortality since the development of health insurance (Kwon, 2009)2. But health outcomes 
are determined by many factors other than health care, such as economic development 
and other socio-political factors, and it is difficult to estimate the contribution of health 
insurance itself to the improvement in health outcomes. Health care utilization has 
increased substantially, along with both the economic growth of the country and the 
development of health insurance.  
 
However, important challenges remained after the achievement of universal population 
coverage. The priority given to rapid extension of population coverage has resulted in 
relatively low contributions and limited benefit coverage (for example, benefit ceiling of 
total 90 days of utilization per year). Out-of-pocket payment still represented more than 
                                                 
2
 For example, life expectancy increased by 12.6 years between 1977 (64.8) and 2003 (77.4).  
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half of the sources of financing by 1990, which meant that the country still presented 
insufficient levels of financial protection (Figure 1). The multiple insurance societies 
resulted in high administrative costs, inequity across societies, and limited risk pooling, 
and many funds in rural areas suffered from fiscal deficits. For example, the proportion 
of the administrative cost in total expense was the lowest (4.8 percent) in the health 
insurance scheme for government and school employees (single insurance fund) and 
the highest (9.5 percent) in the health insurance scheme for the self-employed (NHIC, 
1999). Health insurance contribution for the self-employed as a proportion of income in 
poor rural areas was higher than that in rich urban areas. These concerns became the 
major motivation for the health care reform to merge all funds into a single fund in 2000.  
 
Figure 1 Source of Financing for Health Care in Korea 
 
 
Source: OECD Health Statistics, 2012. 
 
Finally, the rise in medical care utilization was met by a rapid increase in the supply of 
private-sector providers. While private providers are keen to ensure consumer 
satisfaction, very strong profit motivation and the fee-for-service payment mechanism 
have resulted in demand inducement and cost increases. For example, the numbers of 
physicians and hospital beds per 10,000 persons increased from 5 and 17 in 1981 to 8 
and 30 in 1989, respectively. The number of physician visits per capita increased from 
3.7 in 1977 to 6.2 in 1989 (further increased to 10.6 in 2002) (OECD, 2006). As will be 
seen below, private providers also became important sources of opposition to health 
care reform measures, such as changing the payment system from fee-for-service to 
prospective case-based payment, when these became necessary. 
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PART III – HEALTH CARE REFORM AND FISCAL CRISIS 
 
CONTEXT OF HEALTH CARE REFORM  
 
In 2000, two major health care reforms were implemented simultaneously to solve some 
of the key challenges generated by the implementation of the NHI financing structure. 
The high administrative costs created by the proliferation of insurance societies, the 
inequity in contributions across them and the limited cross-subsidization from the better 
off to the poor led to the merging of insurance funds into a single insurer system. The 
perverse financial incentives that existed for physicians and pharmacists to prescribe 
more medicines in order to increase their income led to the separation of drug 
prescribing and dispensing.  
 
The organization of the NHI in decentralized funds led to the creation of more than 350 
quasi-public insurance societies until the late 1990’s. These health insurance societies 
were divided in three categories and were subject to strict regulation by the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (MOHW): (i) the more than 100 health insurance societies for 
industrial workers and their dependents; (ii) a single society for government employees, 
teachers, and their dependents, and (iii) the more than 200 societies for the self-
employed. Beneficiaries were assigned to insurance societies based on their type of 
employment (for employees) and residential area (for the self-employed), and health 
insurance societies did not compete. 
 
Creating a single payer aimed to increase the efficiency of risk pooling and minimize 
administrative costs (Kwon, 2003a). The differences in contribution rates across 
insurance societies, in spite of identical statutory benefits, also raised concerns about 
equity. Members of insurance societies in poor or rural areas had to pay a greater 
proportion of their income in contributions, compared to people in wealthy areas. The 
merger was expected to improve equity by applying national level contribution rates. 
Before the merger, risk sharing mechanisms among insurance societies based on 
expenditure and the proportion of old population in each fund did not address the fiscal 
insolvency of many regional insurance societies in poor or rural areas.  
 
Before the pharmaceutical reform, physicians and pharmacists in Korea both prescribed 
and dispensed medicines. This created financial incentives for physicians and 
pharmacists to dispense more drugs and to select those with greater profit margins 
(Kwon, 2003b), a phenomenon aggravated by the fact that physicians were able to 
purchase drugs at prices that were much lower than the reimbursement rates set by the 
health insurance. In addition, because the government strictly regulated fees for medical 
services through a fee schedule, dispensing drugs was more profitable for physicians 
than providing medical services. The perverse financial incentives for physicians and 
pharmacists and easy consumer access to drugs contributed to the high proportion of 
total health expenditure spent on pharmaceuticals in Korea. The proportion of 
pharmaceutical spending in health care expenditure in Korea was 31%, whereas that in 
OECD countries was below 20% on average in the mid 1990s (NHIC, 1997; OECD, 
1995). More importantly, the system resulted in misuse and/or overuse of drugs such as 
antibiotics. In addition, doctors’ explanation about medications to patients were often 
found wanting. Because the separation reform forced physicians to disclose the 
prescription to patients and pharmacists, pharmacists could have a chance to double-
check prescriptions and give more explanations to patients. 
 15 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMS  
 
The two reforms introduced major structural change to Korea’s health care system. The 
progressive government, the president’s keen interest in social policy, and active 
participation of civic groups played important roles in the two reforms, which were 
discussed for a long time but not implemented due to opposition of vested interest 
groups. The new president used to be a famous leader of democratic movements in the 
former authoritarian regimes. He was keen to ensure social solidarity and 
socioeconomic reforms to improve equity and invited progressive civic groups in the 
policy process. 
 
With two reforms, a paradigm change in health policy making toward a pluralistic model 
with active participation of stakeholders (Kwon and Reich, 2005) happened. The labor 
unions of workers (officers) in the self-employed insurance funds supported the merger 
while those in employee insurance funds opposed it. Both labor unions represented the 
interests of their members (that is, enrollees in their funds) (Kwon, 2003a): (formal 
sector) employees were not supportive of the merger as it would potentially increase 
their contribution because their income was easier to assess, compared with the self-
employed. Furthermore the merger would provide a better and nation-wide career path 
for those working in the self-employed insurance system. Before the merger, health 
insurance funds for the self-employed were small and localized with little mobility of 
personnel.  
 
It should be noted that the Korean health insurance system, although fragmented with 
multiple insurance funds, had favorable conditions for merger such as centralized claim 
review, uniform statutory benefits coverage, and a uniform payment system for 
providers (fee schedules). The uniformity across insurance funds before the merger was 
made possible because government played a key role in the initial design and 
implementation of the health insurance system of Korea. 
 
Physicians concerned with the potential loss of income from the dispensing of medicines 
strongly opposed the medicines reform (Kwon, 2003b), while pharmacists wanted to 
keep the right to prescribe. Physician and pharmacist lobbies were powerful influences 
in health policy and effectively blocked change for a long time (since the universal 
coverage of population). Despite these pressures and because of the strong support of 
civil society, the pharmaceutical reform separating the prescribing and dispensing roles 
was finally adopted in 2000. Civic groups actively participated in the policy reform 
process, supporting the measures proposed by the government, as they were political 
allies of the progressive government. The end of the authoritarian regime and the 
democratization in public policy making opened a critical window of opportunity for a 
major change in Korea’s health policy process, which had been dominated by the 
medical profession and elite bureaucrats (Kwon and Reich, 2005). New groups – most 
importantly, civic groups and labor unions – could participate in the policy process and 
became deeply involved in the design of health care financing reform and 
pharmaceutical reform. Civic groups quickly and actively pursued opportunities for 
health reform, making it possible to adopt policies that threatened vested interests. 
 
However, the implementation of the new policies was not easy. The country faced a 
series of nationwide strikes by physicians, which led to changes and distortions to the 
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reform package.3 In fact, physicians gained strong bargaining power after their nation-
wide strikes, as these had an important negative impact in a health care system in which 
more than 90 percent of hospitals are private. As a result, the government agreed to a 
substantial increase in physicians fees in order to compensate for their loss of income, a 
measure that greatly contributed to the 2001 fiscal crisis of the health insurance system 
(Kwon, 2007), as will be discussed below. The physicians also succeeded in pushing the 
government to defer its planned national extension of the DRG payment system to all 
health-care providers (Kwon, 2003c). 
  
 
Table 2 Fiscal Status of Health Insurance in Korea (Unit: 100 Million Korean Won) 
 1990 1995 1997 1999 2000 2001 2006 2012 
Revenue 24,321 54,354 72,967 86,923 95,294 116,423 223,876 418,192 
Expenditure 21,641 50,537 76,823 95,614 105,384 140,511 224,623 388,035 
Annual Surplus 2,680 3,817 -3,856 -8,691 -10,090 -24,088 -747 30,157 
Accumulated 
Surplus 
7,326 41,200 37,851 22,425 9,189 -18,109 11,798 45,757 
Source: NHIC, Health Insurance Statistics, various years. 
 
COST CONTAINMENT/FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY STRATEGIES 
 
The aging of the population, fee-for-service payment system, increasing demand for 
healthcare, and low contribution rates had all contributed to the accumulating financial 
pressures on Korea’s health system. It was, however, the rapid and sharp increase in 
medical fees – of 44 percent from November 1999 to January 2001 – adopted to end 
the physicians’ strike against the pharmaceutical reform (Table 3) that ultimately 
triggered the fiscal crisis of 2001, when the national health insurance system 
experienced fiscal deficit after depleting all accumulated surplus.4 Before the reforms, 
the Korean government had strongly controlled medical fees without fully including the 
medical profession in the fee setting process.5 However, with the separation reform, 
direct cost control with tightly regulated fee scheduling became less effective as fee 
scheduling became a collective bargaining process rather than a one-sided government 
decision. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 For example, physicians opposed the obligation of generic prescription and were allowed to continue with 
brand-name prescription. 
4 The general public strongly criticized the government, putting the blame for the financial crisis on the two 
reforms. The separation reform definitely accelerated the crisis with the rapid fee rise. However, the impact 
of the integration reform was neutral given the decrease in administrative costs and potential purchasing 
power of the single insurer (National Health Insurance Corporation) 
5 Physicians were reimbursed according to a fee schedule established by the MOHW after approval by the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy. The medical fee was regarded as a public utility charge like the electricity 
rate. 
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Table 3 Rate of Increase for the Medical Fee (Unit: %) 
1998 1999 2000  
(Apr) 
2000  
(July) 
2000  
(Sep) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 
3.50 9.00 6.00 9.20 6.50 7.08 -2.90 2.97 2.65 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
2.99 3.58 2.30 1.94 2.22 2.05 1.64 2.20 2.36 
Source: NHIC, Health Insurance Statistics in various years. 
 
Faced with a fiscal crisis, in May of 2001 the government announced a comprehensive 
policy package of short and long-term financial stability measures and a Special Act to 
support their authority.6 The financial stability measures aimed to share the burden of 
the adjustment among the government, insurers, providers, and the insured. The short-
term measures consisted of a physician fee freeze, dropping some medicines from the 
benefits package, decreased drug prices, increased copayments, and tightening of 
physician claims review (Kwon, 2007). The government plan also included the 
suspension of benefit coverage expansion and a 9 percent annual increase in the 
contribution rate until 2006.7 The long-term measures included strengthening the health 
information management system, payment system reforms, introduction of public long-
term care insurance (to reduce social admissions to acute care hospitals), and the 
expansion of public-sector health institutions. 
 
Two measures in the Special Act deserve special attention: (i) the increase in the 
government subsidy and (ii) the introduction of a Health Insurance Policy Review 
Committee. The Act temporarily increased the government subsidy to the self-employed 
fund from 28 percent to 50 percent, significantly contributing to the fiscal health of the 
health insurance system and changed the trend of steadily declining tax subsidies for 
health insurance. The government subsidy incrementally decreased as the fiscal health 
of health insurance was restored. A major portion of the government’s subsidy came 
from the health promotion fund which was based on the taxation of tobacco products.8 
However, this use of the fund to rescue the health insurance from the financial crisis has 
been criticized for diverting fund resources away from its original purpose of supporting 
health promotion programs.  
 
The single insurer system that emerged after the merger of the many health insurance 
societies meant that major decisions on health insurance became major items in the 
national agenda, requiring a new policy framework and institutional arrangement. In this 
sense, a Health Insurance Policy Deliberation Committee (HIPDC) was created in 2001 
with the mandate to approve major decisions on health insurance, such as contribution 
rates, benefit packages, pricing, etc. The most striking feature of this committee was its 
ability to coordinate and synchronize decisions related to the contribution rate and the 
medical fee, which were previously determined through separate mechanisms, limiting 
the government’s ability to balance the major revenue and expenditure components of 
the health insurance system. Two insurance agencies, the NHIS (National Health 
Insurance Service) and HIRA (Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service) were 
                                                 
6 The Special Act for the Financial Stability of National Health Insurance was enacted in January 2002. 
7 In March 2002, the contribution rate was increased by 6.8 percent, lower than the 9.0 percent planned. In 
the same year the medical fee was also decreased by 2.9 percent, the only cut in the health insurance 
history. 
8 Cigarette prices were increased in 2002 to fund the increased government subsidy to the self-employed 
insurance fund.  
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created after the merger of insurance societies, and they have provided evidence and 
technical inputs to the Health Insurance Policy Deliberation Committee. 
 
The Committee consists of 24 members with the Vice Minister of Health and Welfare as 
its chair. It is a tripartite committee of payers, providers, and public agencies, coupled 
with technical experts. Membership is designated by representative organizations: 8 
members from payers (labor unions, employer associations, civic groups, patient 
groups, etc.), 8 from providers (physician association, hospital association, dentist 
association, pharmacist association, nurse association, traditional physician association, 
etc.), 4 members representing the public interest (MOHW, Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance, NHIS and HIRA), and 4 experts appointed by the government. These four 
experts are usually academics and are supposed to provide neutral technical opinion, 
but health care providers often complain that the four experts tend to support the 
government position, neglecting the providers’ perspective. 
 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
 
The two reforms of 2000 were an important step that helped to improve efficiency and 
equity in financing and delivering health care in Korea. The new single payer system 
increased the pooling capacity and potential bargaining power of the insurer as the 
purchaser, as well as equity in health insurance contributions. Now health insurance has 
a uniform contribution schedule and people with the same income (capacity to pay) 
contribute the same amount regardless of where they work or live. As was expected, the 
separation reform seemed to help control the overuse of drugs. According to Jones 
(2010), the percentage of claims containing an antibiotic prescription declined by 26 
percentage points between 2000 and 2007. From a political economy perspective, the 
introduction of the single insurer system and the experience of fiscal crisis put health 
insurance issues (for example, fiscal status, contribution, benefits, provider payment) on 
the national policy agenda. 
 
As already noted, the two health care reforms introduced a paradigm change in the 
politics and process of health policy making in Korea (Kwon and Reich, 2005). The 
change of government and the president’s keen interest in health policy led to a 
democratization in public policy process and more pluralist context, which opened a 
window for policy reform. The government, for example, surveyed public opinion on 
some of the possible policy measures for fiscal stability before adopting a policy.9 Civic 
groups played an active role in the policy process by shaping the reform proposals, a 
major change from the previous authoritarian policy process that was dominated by a 
closed group of experts, bureaucrats, and medical professionals. The reforms also 
reflected the important roles played by the different interest groups. Strong support by 
the rural population and labor unions contributed to the financing reform. In the 
pharmaceutical reform, civic groups quickly succeeded in setting the reform agenda; the 
medical profession was unable to block the adoption of the reform but their strikes 
influenced the content of the reform during its implementation. Future reform efforts in 
Korea need to consider the political management of vested interest groups and effective 
reform strategies.  
 
                                                 
9 Examples of questions in the survey: (i) what do you think about the argument that the medical fee should 
be lowered? (ii) Do you think the government should keep expanding the benefit coverage in spite of the 
current fiscal instability? 
 19 
Health care delivery in Korea, which is dominated by private providers paid by a fee-for-
service system, is vulnerable to cost increases and fiscal crisis. Fee-for-service gives 
medical providers incentives to increase the volume and intensity of services (for 
example, the amount of medical care provided per visit or hospital admission, or the 
number of visits to providers for a given episode of care) and to choose treatments with 
a greater revenue margin. The inefficiency of fee-for-service payment is exacerbated by 
private providers’ strong incentive for profit. 
 
To this day, the single insurer agency still does not fully exercise its monopsonistic 
bargaining power, deterred by the threat of strike by physicians in the health care 
system where more than 90 percent of hospitals are private. For example, the proposal 
of changing the current fee-for-service payment system to a prospective, case-based 
payment mechanism has faced tough oppositions from health care providers. This is a 
major challenge for the system, as the future financial sustainability and efficiency of 
Korea’s health insurance system hinges on the policy makers’ and regulators’ capacity 
and willingness to effectively use their purchasing power to introduce new effective 
payment systems other than the existing fee-for-service model (Kwon, 2009).  
 
Another legacy of the initial policies that structured Korea’s health insurance scheme in 
the late seventies was the requirement that all health care providers participate in the 
health insurance system. Because the government was then concerned that providers 
would not want to join the health insurance program due to the tight fee schedule, it 
mandated that all medical providers had to treat insured patients. However, Korea may 
now need to re-consider the contractual relation between the insurer and medical 
providers. Korea no longer needs to require all providers to join the NHI, as it has a 
sufficient supply of providers who depend on the health insurance program. In fact, this 
current mandate limits the ability of the single insurer to exercise its purchasing power, 
since it cannot selectively contract with providers based on their performance. To the 
contrary, the change into a contracting model may have the risk of two-tiered system if 
better providers opt out of the national health insurance system. 
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PART IV – GOVERNANCE AND HEALTH INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS (2000–PRESENT) 
 
CONTEXT  
 
The merger of the health insurance societies introduced a new single insurer agency 
(NHIC10: National Health Insurance Corporation) and created a new insurance review 
agency (HIRA: Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service). Even before the 
merger, claims were reviewed by a central agency, which was under the association of 
health insurance funds for employees. Centralized claim review and an integrated 
information system have been an important element of the Korean health insurance 
system, and contributed to the rapid merger of the health insurance societies. 
 
The association of employee insurance funds, which was responsible for the centralized 
claim review for the entire health insurance system (including the self-employed), was 
against the merger, and maintained that the insurance system should have a separate 
agency for claim review and medical assessment, independent of the new single insurer 
agency. For a long time, health care providers complained that claim review was 
frequently driven by the fiscal concerns of the insurer (because the claim review 
department was in the employee insurance fund). They requested that medical claims, 
instead, be reviewed on the basis of the appropriateness of the services provided. 
Consequently, health care providers strongly supported the idea of a separate 
independent health insurance review agency, independent of the NHIC. The 
government, on the other hand, expected that a separate agency specializing in claim 
review, quality management programs, and the assessment of the appropriateness of 
care would be able to more rapidly increase its assessment capacity and contribute to 
improve the quality of health care. 
 
Management of the health insurance system is divided between the two agencies based 
on their specific functions. NHIS handles premium collection, fund pooling, and 
reimbursement to providers, and HIRA handles issues related to purchasing such as 
benefits coverage, payment system design, and claim review. For example, HIRA has 
technical committees for evaluating if a new service or medicine should be included in 
the benefit package. Since 2011, contributions to all social security programs (pension, 
unemployment insurance, work-place injury) were collected by NHIS. The integrated 
information system and nationwide availability of all health insurance information is a 
key factor contributing to effective communication between NHIS (for collection and 
pooling) and HIRA (for purchasing). 
 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE  
 
HIRA plays an important role in determining the payment structure of the NHI.11 But the 
fees-for-service payments are determined by negotiation between the NHIS and each 
provider association such as the Korean Medical Association, Korean Hospital 
Association, etc. If the negotiation fails, the Health Insurance Policy Committee decides 
the fee. In the case of pharmaceuticals, HIRA handles the (positive) listing of new 
                                                 
10 Now called NHIS (National Health Insurance Service) 
11 For example, HIRA determines relative values of individual medical services under the Resource Based 
Relative Value (RBRV) system 
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medicines based on economic evaluation (cost effectiveness) through aforementioned 
technical committees. Then NHIS and the pharmaceutical manufacturer negotiate the 
reimbursement price of medicines.  
 
One of the positive aspects of the division of functions between the two insurance 
agencies is the potential for checks and balances. HIRA, as a new and highly technical 
agency, has helped to introduce a new management culture into the health insurance 
system. The NHIS is, however, a very large organization, and as the monopolistic 
provider of health insurance, it may not have a strong incentive to respond to enrollees’ 
needs quickly, which can also result in an insufficient effort to enhance managerial 
efficiency.  
 
On the other hand, the existence of two separate agencies may lead to some 
duplication of functions and/or divergence between them. The NHIS often complains, for 
example, that the HIRA’s committee responsible for the decisions related to the benefit 
package does not pay enough attention to fiscal implications and consumer preference.  
 
The relationship between NHIS and HIRA is heavily affected by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare. The strong power of MOHW in monitoring the behavior of the two 
insurance agencies comes from its role in approving their budget. MOHW also 
influences the appointment of key top-level officers of the two agencies. Furthermore, 
the Bureau of Health Insurance in the MOHW plays a key role in the formulation of 
health insurance policy, which is implemented by the two insurance agencies.  
 
HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEM 
 
HIRA has increased the accountability and transparency of the health insurance system 
thanks to an IT-based centralized claim review and assessment. Claim review based on 
explicit criteria makes the review process more transparent and makes clear to 
providers what is not paid and why. IT-based claim submission and review expedites the 
payment process, contributing to low administrative cost. NHIS also depends on IT for 
the management of enrollees (for example, income, health care utilization, out-of-pocket 
payments). All health care providers send their claims to HIRA for reimbursement 
(usually monthly). The review process is defined by detailed guidelines (for example, 
which services, how many times a given service can be used,12 etc.). After a 
computerized check for errors, omissions, and miscalculations, HIRA performs an 
indicator-based review (Figure 2). In case of outliers, a stricter review is performed. 
When the review is over, HIRA sends the results to the NHIS, which then pays the 
providers. Thanks to the use of IT, the entire process – from claim to reimbursement – 
takes a maximum of 15 days. In addition to regular staff, HIRA has various committees 
of medical experts from different specialties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 For example, how many time a given cancer medicine can be provided to a cancer patient. 
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Figure 2  Claim Review by HIRA (Health Insurance Review and Assessment)  
 Source: HIRA 
 
 
The fact that HIRA has a good information system also contributes to its quality 
improvement program. HIRA’s Drug Utilization Review (DUR) program is a good 
example of an effective IT application. When physicians prescribe and pharmacists 
dispense medicines, information is immediately forwarded to HIRA. Based on 
nationwide utilization data of patients, HIRA checks (in real time) precautions for age 
and pregnancy, duplications and adverse interactions among prescribed drugs and 
between the drugs prescribed and those currently used by the patient. DUR is expected 
to contribute to health improvement and cost containment. 
 
HIRA also disseminates provider information and performance to consumers (through 
the HIRA website) to help them make rational choices of providers (Kim, 2011). In the 
hospital sector, quality is measured in terms of structure, process and outcome for 
selected areas, such as Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI), acute stroke, use of 
prophylactic antibiotics for surgery, caesarean section, and Coronary Artery Bypass 
Graft (CABG). Regarding outpatient medication, information is gathered on prescription 
rates of antibiotics and injectables, number of medicines per prescription, and cost of 
medicines prescribed. Information on the performance of health care providers is 
disclosed in the HIRA website. Comparative performance information is provided to 
health care providers to help them change their behavior by examining the variation of 
their behavior and performance from those of their colleagues.  
 
HIRA has implemented pay for performance (P4P) for selected areas for tertiary and 
general hospitals (Tchoe, 2011). It began with AMI and Caesarean section. 
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Performance measures include volume, process (use of timely interventions and 
medications), and outcomes (mortality within 30 days) for AMI, and the difference 
between actual and risk-adjusted C-section rates in the case of C-section. The 
performance of 43 big general hospitals was first evaluated at the end of 2008, which 
were then grouped into five categories of relative ranking. A financial incentive of 1 
percent of the total health insurance reimbursement (for a given hospital) was paid to 
the best ranking group (group 1) at the end of 2009. A financial disincentive of -1 
percent of the insurance reimbursement was introduced in 2010 for hospitals with 
performance scores lower than an (absolute) threshold, which was set to the highest 
performance score among hospitals in the group 5 (lowest ranking group) in 2008. 
 
Despite these advances, HIRA needs to expand its performance measurement (that is, 
elaborate existing measures and introduce more measures) and improve its 
transparency through better public disclosure and explanation of how it measures 
performance, so consumers are more informed and able to make better decisions. It 
also needs to be able to control potential distortions in provider behavior, such as the 
selection of less severe patients, the neglect of areas where performance is not 
measured, etc. Although physicians are strongly opposed, DUR should be extended to 
check dose adequacy and the overall appropriateness of prescriptions, taking into 
account patient characteristics. Pay for performance to hospitals needs to take account 
of the performance of individual physicians and be extended to the outpatient sector.  
 
Finally, the overall efficiency of health care provision is limited by the fee-for-service 
payment, which creates perverse incentives for providers to provide more services and 
services with higher profit margins. Claim review for thousands of services under fee-
for-service is very costly. The guideline book for claim review is already too thick, and 
there is continuing controversy and tension between the providers and the insurer over 
the adequacy of the guidelines.  
 24 
PART V – LESSONS LEARNED AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
FROM THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE 
 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ELEMENTS  
 
In Korea, the top down policy process set by an authoritarian regime contributed to the 
rapid extension of population coverage by suppressing potential opposition by 
employers (who had to pay half of the contribution of employees) and health care 
providers (who had to accept the tight fee regulation). As government reduced the fees 
for health insurance, employees regarded enrollment in health insurance as benefits 
(that is, access to health care by paying only a percentage of lower priced services). 
Rapid economic development increased the payment capacity of employers and 
enrollees.  
 
Political legitimization of the military government played a key role in the introduction of 
health insurance in the 1970s and the democratization process and election motivated 
the authoritarian government to rapidly expand population coverage in the late 1980s. 
Along with the political will of the authoritarian regime, its financial commitment in 
subsidizing the self-employed also helped the rapid extension of health insurance to the 
informal sector. Progressive president/government and the democratization of the health 
policy process with active participation of civic organizations contributed to the 
subsequent reforms after the universal coverage of the population. 
 
RISK POOLING AND COVERAGE 
 
The implementation of a single risk pool made it possible to pool risks better and to 
cross subsidize the poor. The fact that insurance membership was family-based (that is, 
included family members and dependents along with the family head) was one of the 
factors that contributed to the rapid expansion of coverage. The institution of multiple 
insurers was more practical in the Korean context, as the inclusion of different 
population groups with diverse characteristics into a single risk pool from the beginning 
of the NHI program would have required costly and complex managerial structures. This 
pragmatic choice also contributed to the rapid extension of population coverage. The 
experience of Korea indicates that starting with multiple pools, but minimizing 
differences in contributions, benefits, and provider payments across pools can be an 
appropriate option.13 Centralized claim review based on uniform guideline and effective 
information system have also helped reduce differences across the pools and enhanced 
the efficiency and equity of the Korean health insurance system.  
 
Prioritization between population coverage and benefits coverage has been difficult in 
Korea. The policy choice of prioritizing population coverage resulted in limited benefit 
coverage. Had Korea started with generous benefits coverage, the rapid extension of 
population coverage would have not been possible due to the high costs (for example,, 
premium) of such a system. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 That is, a decentralized health insurance system as an intermediate stage can be considered. 
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PRIVATE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND REFORM POLITICS 
 
Increased purchasing power and rapid increase in health care utilization due to the 
presence of health insurance have been met by the rapid increase in the supply of 
private health care providers. Health providers that can deliver quality health care are an 
essential component of any health care system. Although the expansion of private 
providers contributed to meeting the rapidly increased demand for health care since 
health insurance was introduced, the predominance of private providers and the passive 
privatization (that is, the number of public providers remained the same, but that of 
private providers increased, resulting in the decline in the relative proportion of public 
providers) have had some side effects (Yang, 1998). Almost all graduates of medical 
schools become specialists, and the role of tertiary care hospitals has been increased. 
For example, tertiary care hospitals accounted for 16.5 percent of total health insurance 
expenditure in 2001, which increased to 22.9 percent in 2010, while the share of 
physician clinics in health insurance expenditure declined from 46.3 percent to 29.6 
percent during that period (NHIC, 2012).  
 
The dominance of private providers has had an impact on health politics and health 
expenditure such as the use of new medicines and high-technology equipment in Korea. 
Private health providers have been very strong opponents to health care reform in 
Korea. Civic groups or citizen participation can counteract these pressures and push the 
government to move toward universal health coverage. Citizens can also participate in 
the definition of benefits so these better reflect their needs and preferences and take 
into account their capacity to pay contributions or taxes (Kwon, et al, 2012). 
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PART VI – FUTURE CHALLENGES 
 
IMPROVE FINANCIAL PROTECTION  
 
Out-of-pocket (OOP) payment still accounts for a significant portion of total health care 
expenditure in Korea (Figure 1), potentially leading to insufficient financial protection. 
The relative cost sharing for insured services and direct payment for un-insured services 
(not in the benefits package) was at 62.7 percent and 37.3 percent of the total out-of-
pocket expenditure in 2006, and has changed to 54.5 percent and 45.5 percent in 2011 
(Seo, et. al, 2011). However, high OOP payment and limited financial protection is not 
only related to the size and depth of the benefit package, but is also heavily affected by 
provider behavior. Korea has experienced a very rapid increase in the provision of 
services not included in the benefits package because these are not subject to fee 
scheduling, generating high profits. As government has incrementally expanded the 
benefits package, providers have quickly induced the demand for new services and 
technology. 
 
EXPAND THE BASE OF INSURANCE CONTRIBUTION FOR FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 
 
Health expenditure in Korea has been increasing rapidly. Although health expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP is still lower than the OECD average, its rate of increase is one 
of the highest among OECD countries (Figure 3). Payment system reform for providers 
is an imminent task for sustainability. In addition, the current contribution setting is 
inefficient as it potentially discourages labor participation in the formal sector, since 
health insurance contributions for employees are only based on wage income, while 
people have increasingly diversified sources of income. The system is, therefore, 
inequitable as it treats wage income less favorably than other types of income. Korea 
needs to expand the income base for health insurance contributions, which should be 
charged on all types of income, leading to surcharges (earmarked for health insurance) 
on rental income, financial income, etc.  
 
Figure 3 Health Expenditure in Korea 
 
Source: OECD Health Statistics, 2012. 
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COPE WITH POPULATION AGING 
 
Korea’s population is aging rapidly. The impact of aging on per capita health 
expenditure is controversial (Zweifel, 1999) as the proximity of death is an important 
determinant of health spending (Sin, et al., 2012). Indeed, population aging has been 
regarded as one of the factors contributing to increased health expenditure. Per capita 
health expenditure of the elderly (over 65 years old) is more than three times greater 
than that of the non-elderly as of 2012 (NHIC, 2012). Korea introduced public long-term 
care insurance, which is also managed by NHIS, in 2008, and one of the arguments 
used for its implementation was to reduce social admissions in acute-care hospitals 
(Kwon, 2008). However, overall, the health care system is not ready to cope with the 
rapidly aging population, and the coordination of health care and long-term care is a 
critical issue. 
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This paper broadly examines the development process of Korea’s health care system toward the 
achievement of Universal Health Coverage. Korea implemented a series of health care reforms after a 
rapid expansion of population coverage to improve efficiency and equity in financing and delivery of 
health care. The authors also investigate changes in the governance structure of Korea’s national health 
Insurance, which is now represented by two agencies: National Health Insurance Service (NHIS) and 
Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service (HIRA). Health insurance agencies have improved the 
accountability and transparency of the health insurance system, thanks to the ICT-based centralized 
claim review and assessment. Lessons and challenges from Korea’s experiences and achievements on 
the road to UHC could provide valuable policy implications to low- and middle-income countries. 
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